feat: add signed bind-backed user icon uploads

.env.example

@@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/gitea_webhook_secret
 IMAGE_ADMIN_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/image_admin_secret
 IMAGE_SYNC_CORE_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/image_sync_core_secret
 IMAGE_SYNC_CORE2026_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/image_sync_core2026_secret
+IMAGE_UPLOAD_CORE_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/image_upload_core_secret
+IMAGE_UPLOAD_CORE2026_SECRET_FILE=./secrets/image_upload_core2026_secret

README.md

@@ -134,6 +134,32 @@ Never give either caller `image_admin_secret`, which also authorizes explicit
 branch changes. This fallback handles webhook delivery outages; if the image
 service itself is stopped, restore it and run the caller command again.
 
+### Short-lived user-icon uploads
+
+Core and Core2026 can store validated account icons in this repository through
+`PUT /v1/uploads/user-icons/<client>/<random-32-hex>.<extension>`. Each game
+server validates the authenticated user and image first, then sends the raw
+image body with `X-Image-Client`, `X-Image-Expires`, `X-Image-Request-Id`, and
+`X-Image-Signature` headers.
+
+The signature is HMAC-SHA256 over
+`expires.requestId.pathname.contentType.sha256(body)`. Expiry may be at most
+five minutes in the future, so a grant cannot be reused for another path,
+content type, body, or later upload. The service also checks the image magic,
+caller scope, and request replay before it writes one immutable file below the
+host bind directory `runtime-data/uploads`. User uploads are deliberately not
+added to Git; Nginx exposes that bind read-only at `/icons/users/`.
+
+Create separate upload secrets with `deploy/scripts/init-secrets.sh`. Mount only
+the matching `image_upload_core_secret` or `image_upload_core2026_secret` on the
+game server. The shared secrets stay server-side in Docker secrets; they are
+not returned to browsers or forwarded to Cloudflare.
+
+Run `deploy/scripts/init-secrets.sh` before the first Compose start so
+`runtime-data/uploads` exists with permissions that allow the hook container to
+write and the Nginx container to read. Back up this directory independently of
+the Git repository when moving servers.
+
 Legacy HTTP mutation is disabled by default. An emergency PHP rollback must
 first stop `image-hook`, then create the ignored `hook/legacy-enabled` sentinel
 in the legacy checkout before restoring its Caddy/Gitea route. Remove the

compose.yaml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ services:
   image-hook:
     build:
       context: ./node-hook
-    image: sam-image-hook:1.1.0
+    image: sam-image-hook:1.2.0
     restart: unless-stopped
     user: "${IMAGE_UID:-1000}:${IMAGE_GID:-1000}"
     read_only: true
@@ -18,9 +18,13 @@ services:
       IMAGE_ALLOWED_BRANCHES: ${IMAGE_ALLOWED_BRANCHES:-master}
       IMAGE_PUBLIC_BASES: ${IMAGE_PUBLIC_BASES:-https://sam.hided.net/image,https://sam-image.hided.net}
       IMAGE_STATE_PATH: /var/lib/image-hook/state.json
+      IMAGE_UPLOAD_ROOT: /var/lib/image-hook/uploads
+      IMAGE_UPLOAD_STATE_PATH: /var/lib/image-hook/upload-state.json
       GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/gitea_webhook_secret
       IMAGE_ADMIN_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/image_admin_secret
       IMAGE_SYNC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES: core=/run/secrets/image_sync_core_secret,core2026=/run/secrets/image_sync_core2026_secret
+      IMAGE_UPLOAD_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES: core=/run/secrets/image_upload_core_secret,core2026=/run/secrets/image_upload_core2026_secret
+      MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES: "51200"
     volumes:
       - type: bind
         source: ${IMAGE_REPOSITORY_PATH:-.}
@@ -31,6 +35,8 @@ services:
       - image_admin_secret
       - image_sync_core_secret
       - image_sync_core2026_secret
+      - image_upload_core_secret
+      - image_upload_core2026_secret
     tmpfs:
       - /tmp:size=16m,mode=1777
     cap_drop: [ALL]
@@ -50,7 +56,7 @@ services:
   image-web:
     build:
       context: ./deploy/nginx
-    image: sam-image-web:1.1.0
+    image: sam-image-web:1.2.0
     restart: unless-stopped
     depends_on:
       image-hook:
@@ -65,6 +71,10 @@ services:
         source: ${IMAGE_REPOSITORY_PATH:-.}
         target: /srv/image
         read_only: true
+      - type: bind
+        source: ./runtime-data/uploads
+        target: /srv/user-icons
+        read_only: true
     tmpfs:
       - /tmp:size=8m,mode=1777
     cap_drop: [ALL]
@@ -95,3 +105,7 @@ secrets:
     file: ${IMAGE_SYNC_CORE_SECRET_FILE:-./secrets/image_sync_core_secret}
   image_sync_core2026_secret:
     file: ${IMAGE_SYNC_CORE2026_SECRET_FILE:-./secrets/image_sync_core2026_secret}
+  image_upload_core_secret:
+    file: ${IMAGE_UPLOAD_CORE_SECRET_FILE:-./secrets/image_upload_core_secret}
+  image_upload_core2026_secret:
+    file: ${IMAGE_UPLOAD_CORE2026_SECRET_FILE:-./secrets/image_upload_core2026_secret}

deploy/nginx/templates/default.conf.template

@@ -69,6 +69,18 @@ http {
         proxy_request_buffering on;
     }
 
+    location ^~ /v1/uploads/user-icons/ {
+        limit_except PUT { deny all; }
+        client_max_body_size 50k;
+        proxy_pass http://image-hook:8081;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Image-Client $http_x_image_client;
+        proxy_set_header X-Image-Expires $http_x_image_expires;
+        proxy_set_header X-Image-Request-Id $http_x_image_request_id;
+        proxy_set_header X-Image-Signature $http_x_image_signature;
+        proxy_request_buffering on;
+    }
+
     location ^~ /v1/admin/ { return 404; }
     location = /image { return 404; }
     location = /image/ { return 404; }
@@ -80,6 +92,15 @@ http {
         add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
     }
 
+    location ^~ /icons/users/ {
+        alias /srv/user-icons/;
+        etag on;
+        expires 1y;
+        add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable" always;
+        add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*" always;
+        add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
+    }
+
     location ^~ /icons/ {
         try_files $uri =404;
         add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*" always;

deploy/scripts/init-secrets.sh

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ state_dir="$repository_dir/runtime-data"
 umask 077
 mkdir -p "$secret_dir"
 mkdir -p "$state_dir"
-for name in gitea_webhook_secret image_admin_secret image_sync_core_secret image_sync_core2026_secret; do
+mkdir -p "$state_dir/uploads"
+for name in gitea_webhook_secret image_admin_secret image_sync_core_secret image_sync_core2026_secret image_upload_core_secret image_upload_core2026_secret; do
     path="$secret_dir/$name"
     if [ ! -e "$path" ]; then
         openssl rand -hex 32 > "$path"
@@ -17,5 +18,6 @@ for name in gitea_webhook_secret image_admin_secret image_sync_core_secret image
     chmod 600 "$path"
 done
 chmod 700 "$state_dir"
+chmod 755 "$state_dir/uploads"
 
 echo "Secret files are ready in $secret_dir (values not printed)."

node-hook/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "sam-image-hook",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {

node-hook/src/auth.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+import { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 
 export function hmacHex(secret, body) {
   return createHmac('sha256', secret).update(body).digest('hex');
@@ -37,3 +37,19 @@ export function verifyAdminSignature({ secret, timestamp, requestId, body, suppl
     body,
   ]), supplied);
 }
+
+export function uploadSignature(secret, { expires, requestId, pathname, contentType, body }) {
+  const digest = createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex');
+  return hmacHex(secret, `${expires}.${requestId}.${pathname}.${contentType}.${digest}`);
+}
+
+export function verifyUploadSignature({ secret, expires, requestId, pathname, contentType, body, supplied, now = Date.now() }) {
+  if (!/^\d{10}$/.test(String(expires ?? '')) || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{8,128}$/.test(requestId ?? '')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const expiresAt = Number(expires) * 1000;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt < now || expiresAt > now + 5 * 60 * 1000) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return verifyHexHmac(secret, `${expires}.${requestId}.${pathname}.${contentType}.${createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex')}`, supplied);
+}

node-hook/src/config.mjs

@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ function secret(name, fileName) {
   return readFileSync(path, 'utf8').trim();
 }
 
-function syncClientSecrets() {
-  const entries = text('IMAGE_SYNC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES', '')
+function clientSecrets(variableName) {
+  const entries = text(variableName, '')
     .split(',')
     .map((entry) => entry.trim())
     .filter(Boolean);
   if (entries.length === 0) {
-    throw new Error('IMAGE_SYNC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES is required');
+    throw new Error(`${variableName} is required`);
   }
 
   const result = Object.create(null);
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ function syncClientSecrets() {
     const client = entry.slice(0, separator);
     const path = entry.slice(separator + 1);
     if (separator < 1 || !/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{1,31}$/.test(client) || !path) {
-      throw new Error(`Invalid image sync client entry: ${entry}`);
+      throw new Error(`Invalid ${variableName} client entry: ${entry}`);
     }
     const value = readFileSync(path, 'utf8').trim();
     if (value.length < 32) {
-      throw new Error(`Image sync secret for ${client} must be at least 32 characters`);
+      throw new Error(`${variableName} secret for ${client} must be at least 32 characters`);
     }
     if (result[client]) {
-      throw new Error(`Duplicate image sync client: ${client}`);
+      throw new Error(`Duplicate ${variableName} client: ${client}`);
     }
     result[client] = value;
   }
@@ -73,7 +73,11 @@ export function loadConfig() {
       .filter(Boolean),
     webhookSecret,
     adminSecret,
-    syncClientSecrets: syncClientSecrets(),
+    syncClientSecrets: clientSecrets('IMAGE_SYNC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES'),
+    uploadClientSecrets: clientSecrets('IMAGE_UPLOAD_CLIENT_SECRET_FILES'),
     maxBodyBytes: Number(text('MAX_BODY_BYTES', '1048576')),
+    maxUploadBytes: Number(text('MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES', '51200')),
+    uploadRoot: text('IMAGE_UPLOAD_ROOT', '/var/lib/image-hook/uploads'),
+    uploadStatePath: text('IMAGE_UPLOAD_STATE_PATH', '/var/lib/image-hook/upload-state.json'),
   };
 }

node-hook/src/server.mjs

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { createServer } from 'node:http';
 import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { loadConfig } from './config.mjs';
-import { verifyAdminSignature, verifyHexHmac } from './auth.mjs';
+import { verifyAdminSignature, verifyHexHmac, verifyUploadSignature } from './auth.mjs';
 import { DeploymentError, GitService } from './git-service.mjs';
+import { UploadStore } from './upload-store.mjs';
 
 function json(response, status, value) {
   const body = JSON.stringify(value);
@@ -35,9 +36,22 @@ function parseJson(body) {
   }
 }
 
+function hasImageSignature(body, extension) {
+  if (extension === 'png') return body.length >= 8 && body.subarray(0, 8).equals(Buffer.from('89504e470d0a1a0a', 'hex'));
+  if (extension === 'jpg') return body.length >= 3 && body[0] === 0xff && body[1] === 0xd8 && body[2] === 0xff;
+  if (extension === 'gif') return body.length >= 6 && ['GIF87a', 'GIF89a'].includes(body.subarray(0, 6).toString('ascii'));
+  if (extension === 'webp') return body.length >= 12 && body.subarray(0, 4).toString('ascii') === 'RIFF'
+    && body.subarray(8, 12).toString('ascii') === 'WEBP';
+  if (extension === 'avif') return body.length >= 16 && body.subarray(4, 8).toString('ascii') === 'ftyp'
+    && (body.subarray(8, 64).includes(Buffer.from('avif')) || body.subarray(8, 64).includes(Buffer.from('avis')));
+  return false;
+}
+
 export async function createApp(config = loadConfig(), dependencies = {}) {
   const service = dependencies.service ?? new GitService(config);
+  const uploadStore = dependencies.uploadStore ?? new UploadStore(config);
   await service.initialize();
+  await uploadStore.initialize();
 
   const server = createServer(async (request, response) => {
     const url = new URL(request.url, 'http://image-hook');
@@ -135,6 +149,47 @@ export async function createApp(config = loadConfig(), dependencies = {}) {
         });
         return json(response, 200, { ok: true, ...result });
       }
+      if (request.method === 'PUT' && url.pathname.startsWith('/v1/uploads/user-icons/')) {
+        const client = request.headers['x-image-client'];
+        const expires = request.headers['x-image-expires'];
+        const requestId = request.headers['x-image-request-id'];
+        const contentType = request.headers['content-type']?.toLowerCase() ?? '';
+        const knownClient = typeof client === 'string' && Object.hasOwn(config.uploadClientSecrets, client);
+        const match = url.pathname.match(/^\/v1\/uploads\/user-icons\/([a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{1,31})\/([a-f0-9]{32})\.(avif|webp|jpg|png|gif)$/);
+        if (!match || match[1] !== client) {
+          throw new DeploymentError('Invalid upload path', 400);
+        }
+        const mimeByExtension = {
+          avif: 'image/avif', webp: 'image/webp', jpg: 'image/jpeg', png: 'image/png', gif: 'image/gif',
+        };
+        if (contentType !== mimeByExtension[match[3]]) {
+          throw new DeploymentError('Content-Type does not match upload path', 415);
+        }
+        const body = await readBody(request, config.maxUploadBytes);
+        const signatureValid = verifyUploadSignature({
+          secret: knownClient ? config.uploadClientSecrets[client] : 'invalid-client-secret'.padEnd(32, '!'),
+          expires,
+          requestId,
+          pathname: url.pathname,
+          contentType,
+          body,
+          supplied: request.headers['x-image-signature'],
+        });
+        if (!knownClient || !signatureValid) {
+          return json(response, 401, { ok: false, reason: 'invalid or expired upload grant' });
+        }
+        if (!hasImageSignature(body, match[3])) {
+          throw new DeploymentError('Body is not the declared image format', 400);
+        }
+        const result = await uploadStore.store({
+          requestKey: `${client}:${requestId}`,
+          client,
+          filename: `${match[2]}.${match[3]}`,
+          body,
+        });
+        const urls = config.publicBases.map((base) => `${base}/${result.path}`);
+        return json(response, 201, { ok: true, ...result, urls });
+      }
       return json(response, 404, { ok: false, reason: 'not found' });
     } catch (error) {
       await service.recordError(error).catch(() => undefined);
@@ -146,7 +201,7 @@ export async function createApp(config = loadConfig(), dependencies = {}) {
     }
   });
 
-  return { server, service };
+  return { server, service, uploadStore };
 }
 
 if (process.argv[1] === new URL(import.meta.url).pathname) {

node-hook/src/upload-store.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { mkdir, readFile, rename, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { DeploymentError } from './git-service.mjs';
+
+export class UploadStore {
+  constructor(config) {
+    this.root = config.uploadRoot;
+    this.statePath = config.uploadStatePath;
+    this.queue = Promise.resolve();
+    this.uploads = [];
+  }
+
+  async initialize() {
+    await mkdir(this.root, { recursive: true });
+    await mkdir(dirname(this.statePath), { recursive: true });
+    try {
+      const saved = JSON.parse(await readFile(this.statePath, 'utf8'));
+      this.uploads = Array.isArray(saved.uploads) ? saved.uploads : [];
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') throw error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  store({ requestKey, client, filename, body }) {
+    const operation = this.queue.then(async () => {
+      if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{1,31}$/.test(client)
+        || !/^[a-f0-9]{32}\.(?:avif|webp|jpg|png|gif)$/.test(filename)) {
+        throw new DeploymentError('Invalid upload path', 400);
+      }
+      const relativePath = `${client}/${filename}`;
+      const path = `icons/users/${relativePath}`;
+      const digest = createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex');
+      const previous = this.uploads.find((upload) => upload.key === requestKey);
+      if (previous) {
+        if (previous.path !== path || previous.digest !== digest) {
+          throw new DeploymentError('Upload request ID was already used', 409);
+        }
+        return { duplicate: true, path: previous.path };
+      }
+      const destination = join(this.root, relativePath);
+      await mkdir(dirname(destination), { recursive: true });
+      try {
+        await writeFile(destination, body, { flag: 'wx', mode: 0o644 });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (error.code !== 'EEXIST' || !(await readFile(destination)).equals(body)) {
+          throw new DeploymentError('Upload path already exists', 409);
+        }
+      }
+      this.uploads = [...this.uploads.slice(-999), { key: requestKey, path, digest }];
+      await this.#save();
+      return { duplicate: false, path };
+    });
+    this.queue = operation.catch(() => undefined);
+    return operation;
+  }
+
+  async #save() {
+    const temporary = `${this.statePath}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
+    await writeFile(temporary, JSON.stringify({ uploads: this.uploads }, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
+    await rename(temporary, this.statePath);
+  }
+}

node-hook/test/server.test.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import { once } from 'node:events';
 import test from 'node:test';
-import { adminSignature } from '../src/auth.mjs';
+import { adminSignature, uploadSignature } from '../src/auth.mjs';
 import { createApp } from '../src/server.mjs';
 
+const noUploadStore = { async initialize() {}, async store() { throw new Error('must not upload'); } };
+
 test('sync endpoint authenticates a scoped caller and passes only an optional commit', async (t) => {
   const calls = [];
   const service = {
@@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ test('sync endpoint authenticates a scoped caller and passes only an optional co
   const { server } = await createApp({
     maxBodyBytes: 4096,
     syncClientSecrets: { core: secret },
-  }, { service });
+  }, { service, uploadStore: noUploadStore });
   server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
   await once(server, 'listening');
   t.after(() => server.close());
@@ -42,6 +44,73 @@ test('sync endpoint authenticates a scoped caller and passes only an optional co
   assert.deepEqual(calls, [{ requestKey: `core:${requestId}`, expectedCommit: 'a'.repeat(40) }]);
 });
 
+test('upload endpoint accepts a short-lived body-bound grant and rejects replay or tampering', async (t) => {
+  const service = {
+    async initialize() {},
+    async recordError() {},
+  };
+  const calls = [];
+  const uploadStore = {
+    async initialize() {},
+    async store(value) {
+      calls.push(value);
+      return { duplicate: false, path: `icons/users/${value.client}/${value.filename}` };
+    },
+  };
+  const secret = 'u'.repeat(32);
+  const config = {
+    maxBodyBytes: 4096,
+    maxUploadBytes: 51200,
+    syncClientSecrets: { core: 's'.repeat(32) },
+    uploadClientSecrets: { core2026: secret },
+    publicBases: ['https://sam-image.hided.net', 'https://sam.hided.net/image'],
+  };
+  const { server } = await createApp(config, { service, uploadStore });
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  t.after(() => server.close());
+  const address = server.address();
+  const pathname = `/v1/uploads/user-icons/core2026/${'a'.repeat(32)}.png`;
+  const body = Buffer.from('89504e470d0a1a0a00000000', 'hex');
+  const expires = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60);
+  const requestId = 'upload-request-1234';
+  const signature = uploadSignature(secret, { expires, requestId, pathname, contentType: 'image/png', body });
+  const headers = {
+    'content-type': 'image/png',
+    'x-image-client': 'core2026',
+    'x-image-expires': expires,
+    'x-image-request-id': requestId,
+    'x-image-signature': signature,
+  };
+  const accepted = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}${pathname}`, { method: 'PUT', headers, body });
+  assert.equal(accepted.status, 201);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls[0], {
+    requestKey: `core2026:${requestId}`,
+    client: 'core2026',
+    filename: `${'a'.repeat(32)}.png`,
+    body,
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual((await accepted.json()).urls, [
+    `https://sam-image.hided.net/icons/users/core2026/${'a'.repeat(32)}.png`,
+    `https://sam.hided.net/image/icons/users/core2026/${'a'.repeat(32)}.png`,
+  ]);
+
+  const tampered = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}${pathname}`, {
+    method: 'PUT', headers, body: Buffer.from('89504e470d0a1a0affffffff', 'hex'),
+  });
+  assert.equal(tampered.status, 401);
+  const expired = '1000000000';
+  const expiredHeaders = {
+    ...headers,
+    'x-image-expires': expired,
+    'x-image-signature': uploadSignature(secret, { expires: expired, requestId, pathname, contentType: 'image/png', body }),
+  };
+  const expiredResponse = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}${pathname}`, {
+    method: 'PUT', headers: expiredHeaders, body,
+  });
+  assert.equal(expiredResponse.status, 401);
+});
+
 test('sync endpoint rejects unknown callers and body fields outside the sync contract', async (t) => {
   const service = {
     async initialize() {},
@@ -49,7 +118,10 @@ test('sync endpoint rejects unknown callers and body fields outside the sync con
     async recordError() {},
   };
   const secret = 's'.repeat(32);
-  const { server } = await createApp({ maxBodyBytes: 4096, syncClientSecrets: { core: secret } }, { service });
+  const { server } = await createApp(
+    { maxBodyBytes: 4096, syncClientSecrets: { core: secret } },
+    { service, uploadStore: noUploadStore },
+  );
   server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
   await once(server, 'listening');
   t.after(() => server.close());

node-hook/test/upload-store.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import test from 'node:test';
+import { UploadStore } from '../src/upload-store.mjs';
+
+test('stores uploads only in the bind directory and persists replay state', async (t) => {
+  const root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'image-upload-store-'));
+  t.after(() => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const config = { uploadRoot: join(root, 'uploads'), uploadStatePath: join(root, 'upload-state.json') };
+  const body = Buffer.from('immutable image bytes');
+  const filename = `${'a'.repeat(32)}.png`;
+  const store = new UploadStore(config);
+  await store.initialize();
+  const first = await store.store({ requestKey: 'core2026:request-1', client: 'core2026', filename, body });
+  assert.deepEqual(first, { duplicate: false, path: `icons/users/core2026/${filename}` });
+  assert.equal(await readFile(join(root, 'uploads', 'core2026', filename), 'utf8'), 'immutable image bytes');
+
+  const restarted = new UploadStore(config);
+  await restarted.initialize();
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    await restarted.store({ requestKey: 'core2026:request-1', client: 'core2026', filename, body }),
+    { duplicate: true, path: `icons/users/core2026/${filename}` },
+  );
+  await assert.rejects(
+    restarted.store({
+      requestKey: 'core2026:request-1',
+      client: 'core2026',
+      filename: `${'b'.repeat(32)}.png`,
+      body,
+    }),
+    /already used/,
+  );
+  await assert.rejects(
+    restarted.store({ requestKey: 'core2026:request-2', client: '../escape', filename, body }),
+    /Invalid upload path/,
+  );
+});